Application of the Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural company by Cabrera García, Suitberto et al.
AGRIC. ECON.  CZECH, 59, 2013 (1): 1–7 1
The present paper is one in a series of results 
obtained as a part of the Project A2/039476/11 – 
“Institutional strengthening of teaching the subjects 
of Statistics, Operations Research and Reliability and 
Quality, and their scientific application to topics of 
regional interest”, funded by the Spanish Agency for 
International Development Cooperation (AECID). 
This project is part of a program for funding university 
cooperation and scientific research programs during 
2010 and developed between the Technical University 
of Valencia (Spain) and the Universities of Holguín, 
Granma and Las Tunas, all three located in the East 
of the Republic of Cuba. This project continues a 
previous collaboration of several years between the 
Statistics Departments of all four universities. This 
collaboration deals, on the one hand, with research 
on teaching statistics, and on the other hand, on the 
application of economic and mathematic models to 
regional economic sectors with the target of obtaining 
results to improve the quality of life for the resident 
population.
The goal of the present paper is demonstrating 
the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium point, 
as proposed by Nash (Luce and Raiffa 1957), in the 
case of an agricultural company that is considered 
together with its three sub-units in developing a 
game with perfect information. Recently, other au-
thors have treated similar problems of improving 
production efficiency in agricultural environments 
by using a stochastic parametric approach (Sojková 
et al. 2008), methods based neural networks (Trenz 
et al. 2011) or decision making theory (Beranová 
and Martinovičová 2010). Only production results in 
terms of several crops will be considered in this game. 
We will analyze the following situation, in which for 
simplicity, only three participants are considered. 
A management center A0 distributes the available 
resources among two production sub-units under 
its supervision. Let us denote these units B1 and 
B2. Let b be the resources vector of A0; u and v are 
vectors of resources received by B1 and B2. Vectors 
b, u and v have same dimensions. The sub-units B1 
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and B2 use the assigned resources to produce goods 
(or services). Vectors X and Y represent the prod-
uct quantities elaborated by B1 and B2. Incomes of 
A0, B1 and B2 depend on the production amount 
obtained by B1 and B2.
Th is situation can be considered a game in which 
there are three players. It can be represented by a tree, a 
game with perfect information (Mc Kinsey 1952; Owen 
1958), whose vertex includes all possible alternatives 
of player A0. As long as this game is based on perfect 
information, it can be said that at least one equilibrium 
situation exists in the class of pure strategies (Luce 
and Raiﬀ a 1957; Szep and Forgo 1995).
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Game strategies
The set of all possible alternatives of player A0 has 
the following form: 
???? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ??  (1)
The set of all possible alternatives of player B1 is 
given by all the possible function-vectors of param-
eter u, that is: 
???? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ??  (2)
where a is a constant vector and A is a known matrix. 
Vector a can be considered as some own resources 
of that unit.
The set of alternatives of player B2 is analogous to 
the previously defined and has the following form:
???? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ??  (3)
where b is a vector with analogous characteristics to a.
Earning functions
The earnings of A0 are determined by the function:
???????? ????? ??? ??? ? ? ?????? ? ??????  (4)
where a1 ≥ 0, a2 ≥ 0 and they both have the same 
dimensions as vectors X(u) and Y(v). 
Expressions a1X and a2Y are scalar products. Vectors 
a1 y a2 are interpreted as the earning of A0 per unit 
produced in B1 and B2 respectively.
Earnings of player B1 are defined by:
???????? ????? ??? ??? ? ? ??? ?????? ?? ? ??????  (5)
where c1 ≥ 0 and c1X is a scalar product, c1 is inter-
preted as the earning obtained by B1 per produced unit.
Earnings of B2 are defined by:
???????? ????? ??? ??? ? ? ??? ?????? ?? ? ??????  (6)
where c2 ≥ 0 and it is interpreted as the earning ob-
tained by B2 per produced unit. 
Nash equilibrium (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Imbert 
Tamayo and Petrosian 1980):
Player B1 must calculate the set of optimal vectors 
X*(u) solutions of the linear parametric programming 
problem (Gould et al. 1993; Hillier and Lieberman 
2001):
max c1X = c1X*(u) ( 7 )
with XA ≤ u + a; X ≥ 0; a ≥ 0
where u is a parameter vector and the vector a rep-
resents resources that do not depend on A0.
Player B2 must calculate the set of optimal vectors 
Y*(v) solutions of the linear parametric program-
ming problem:
max c2Y = c2Y*(v) ( 8 )
with YB ≤ v + b; v ≥ 0; b ≥ 0
Here v is a parameter vector and b represents re-
sources owned by B2 that do not depend on A0.
For player A0, the optimal alternative to choose is 
the solution to the following optimization problem:
?????? ???
? ??? ?????????  (9)
with u+ v ≤ b; u ≥ 0; v ≥ 0
Solving problem (9) gives a pair of vectors (u*, v*), 
that determine the corresponding optimum produc-
tion plans from the viewpoint of A0.
If A0, B1 and B2 make their selection in an optim 
al manner the following set is obtained:
L = {X*(u), Y*( v), (u*,v*)} (10)
In Imbert Tamayo and Petrosian (1980), it is dem-
onstrated that the solution given in L is a Nash equi-
librium solution. It is interesting to recall that the 
Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a set of ex-
pectations relative to the selection of each one of the 
players in a way that, when the selection of the rest 
of the players is revealed, none of them would want 
to change his own selection.
This indicates that once the successive decisions 
conforming L is established, if one of the players 
takes a decision that is non-congruent with this set, 
he/she will obtain earnings equal or less than those 
guaranteed by playing according to L.
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The case of the Coffee and Cocoa Company 
of Bayate, El Salvador. Guantánamo Province 
(Betancourt Valdés 2010)
Theoretically, the previous approach is in practice 
applicable to any real company in which all possible 
decisions to be taken by its management and the man-
agement of the production units follow the approach 
given by Equations (1)–(10). It can be generalized to 
any number of participants.
As it is stated at the beginning of this work, the 
existence of a Nash equilibrium point is demon-
strated in the following for a particular company and 
how it can be reached. In this case, it is the Coffee 
and Cocoa Company of Bayate, in the town of El 
Salvador, the Guantánamo province. This company 
manages a set of the Cooperative Production Basic 
Units (CPBUs).
These CPBUs, on top of producing coffee, use a part 
of their productive land to cultivate a set of products 
for sale as the auto-consumption of the employees 
and for market sale. The amount of products to be 
sold to the employees is normalized, and therefore 
it constitutes a minimum limit for the land to be 
planted of each crop. An amount of land is com-
mitted to this purpose and it can be planted twice a 
year: in spring and winter, except for yucca that has 
a development period of more than six months. In 
the following, only these crops will be considered, 
not the coffee crop.
Essentially, the present work is focused on defining 
which one is the best policy among: (a) each unit acts 
on its own without considering any possible benefits 
to obtain collectively; or (b) that they coordinate their 
efforts as a whole.
If the problem of optimal distribution of the com-
pany’s available resources is solved and each one of 
the production units uses optimally the received 
resources, a Nash equilibrium can be reached, since 
the benefits received by each one of the four players 
will be equal or higher to the maximum quantities 
if the CPBUs would have acted in a different way.
To demonstrate this, initially a Linear Programming 
(LP) problem will be solved covering all three CPBUs. 
Then, a Linear Programming problem will be solved 
for each CPBU separately. The results will be com-
pared to demonstrate that in the first case, a Nash 
equilibrium situation will hold.
Model construction
Sub-indexes
i: indicates the product type which in this case are 
i =1, indicates yucca; i = 2, sweet potato; i = 3, black 
bean; i = 4, red bean; i = 5, dry corn; i = 6, tender 
corn; i = 7, cucumber; i = 8, rice; i = 9, pumpkin;
j: indicates the sale destination: j = 1, market sale; 
j = 2, sale for auto-consumption.
k: indicates if the product is collected in spring or 
winter (k = 1, spring; k = 2, winter).
In summary, sub-indexes respectively indicate: 
i the product planted, j the production destination 
and k the production season.
Essential variables 
Using a vector-based model, variables X, Y and Z 
can be defined with vectors representing the quantity 
of land devoted in each production unit to crop i, for 
destination j and in season k.
For the CPBU Gabriel Lamot (Dajao), variables 
have the general form: Xijk. For the CPBU Camilo 
Cienfuegos (Melián),variables have the general form 
Yijk; and for the CPBU Máximo Gómez (Baltazar, 
they have the form Zijk, where each time i = 1, 2, …, 
9; j = 1, 2, and k = 1, 2. The example for vector X is 
given as Equations 11.
 
For example, X111 will represent the area (in hec-
tares) dedicated to the yucca crop for market sale in 
the spring season, and equivalently X232 will repre-
sent the area devoted to sweet potato s for the auto-
consumption in the winter season. The same scheme 
holds for the other essential variables and in the 
following for the rest of the parameters of the model.
Parameters
C: cost vector whose elements Cijk represent the 
cost per hectare of crop i for sale in destination j 
planted in the k season, where possible index values 
are i = 1, 2, …, 9; j = 1, 2 and k = 1, 2 (Equations 12).
G: earnings vector whose elements Gijk represent 
the gross earnings per hectare for product i with sale 
destination j and cultivated in season k;  i = 1, 2, …, 
9; j = 1, 2; k = 1, 2 (Equations 13).
R: yield matrix whose elements rijk: yield per hec-
tare of crop i (i = 1, 2, …, 9) to be sold externally or 
to employees (j =1, 2) planted in spring or winter 
(k = 1, 2) (Equations 14).
? ?
111 211 311 411 511 611 711 811 911
121 221 321 421 521 621 721 821 921
112 212 312 412 512 612 712 812 912
122 222 322 422 522 622 722 822 922
X X X X X X X X X ...
X X X X X X X X X ...
X
X X X X X X X X X ...
X X X X X X X X X
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
  (11)
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T: available land vector whose elements T represent 
the available land (hectares) of each CPBU according 
to the season: k = 1 spring; k = 2, winter, respectively 
(Equations 15).
PCPBU: minimum production vector (in tons) for 
each crop product and CPBU (i = 1, 2, … , 9 and 
CPBUs of Dajao (Da), Melián (Me) and Baltazar (Ba)) 
– (Equations 16).
B: available budget to perform planting and har-
vest ($).
The general model has the following matrix form:
Restriction approach:
(a) On land availability: where sum of all areas planted 
with the different crops (each of type i) in the 
different locations (CPBUs) must be equal to the 
total available land.
??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ????    k = 1, 2  (17)
where sum[.] stands for the sum of all elements of 
the respective vector.
(b) On budget: where sum of all production costs has 
to be lower than the actual budget B, and in terms 
of scalar product of the different vectors.
???? ???? ? ???? ???? ? ???? ???? ? ?  (18)
(c) On minimal production: where production of 
each crop i at each CPBU has to comply with the 
minimum required production for each crop ele-
ment of the minimum production vector PCPBU.
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
T
Da
T
Me
T
Ba
R . X P
R . Y P
R . Z P
?
?
?
  (19)
Target function: where cumulative earnings of all 
CPBUs are maximized:
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?T T TMax Z G X G Y G Z? ? ?   (20)
Information processing
Parameters of the cost vector C (Cijk) are calculated 
from the cost per hectare files for each one of the 
crops generated by the Company (in units 10–3$/ha). 
This procedure integrates the fact that the employed 
technology and the agricultural activities performed 
on each crop variety are identical for all CPBUs man-
aged by the Company (Equations 21).
Parameters of the earnings vector G (Gijk, earnings 
per hectare) are determined, in the case of products 
to be sold to the employees, from prices fixed by the 
Minagri (the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture). In the 
case of products to be sold to the Acopio (National 
? ?
111 211 311 411 511 611 711 811 911
121 221 321 421 521 621 721 821 921
112 212 312 412 512 612 712 812 912
122 222 322 422 522 622 722 822 922
G G G G G G G G G ...
G G G G G G G G G ...
G
G G G G G G G G G ...
G G G G G G G G G
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
  (13)
? ?
111 211 311 411 511 611 711 811 911
121 221 321 421 521 621 721 821 921
112 212 312 412 512 612 712 812 912
122 222 322 422 522 622 722 822 922
r r r r r r r r r ...
r r r r r r r r r ...
R
r r r r r r r r r ...
r r r r r r r r r
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
  (14)
? ? ? ?1 2 1,Da 1,Me 1,Ba 2,Da 2,Me 2,BaT T T T T T T T T? ?? ? ? ?   (15)
? ? ? ? 1Da 2Da 3Da 4Da 5Da 6Da 7Da 8Da 9DaCPBU Da Me Ba 1Me 2Me 3Me 4Me 5Me 6Me 7Me 8Me 9Me
1Ba 2Ba 3Ba 4Ba 5Ba 6Ba 7Ba 8Ba 9Ba
P P P P P P P P P ...
P P P P P P P P P P P P P ...
P P P P P P P P P
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
  (16)
? ?
111 211 311 411 511 611 711 811 911
121 221 321 421 521 621 721 821 921
112 212 312 412 512 612 712 812 912
122 222 322 422 522 622 722 822 922
C C C C C C C C C ...
C C C C C C C C C ...
C
C C C C C C C C C ...
C C C C C C C C C
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
 
 (12)
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Distribution Company of Agricultural and Livestock 
Products), it is based on the official price list fixed by 
the Guantánamo Province Government. From these 
prices, the earning per hectare is obtained in units 
10–4$/ha and, subtracting the cost per hectare, the 
benefit is obtained (Equations 22).
Parameters of the yield vector R (rijk) are obtained 
from the statistical files from the last years for the 
considered products (Equations 23).
Parameters of the minimal areas vector PCPBU de-
voted to each type of crop in each CPBU are given 
by Equations 24.
Parameter B is the budget as planned by the 
Company, whose total value is $ 60 000, which is 
then broke down per CPBU. Hence, the budget of the 
CPBU of Dajao is $ 16 235, the budget of the CPBU of 
Melián is $ 19 765, and for the Baltazar, it is $ 24 000. 
Parameters of available land vector T (Tk,CPBU) 
are taken as:
? ? ? ?T 2.3 2.8 3.4 2.3 2.8 3.4?   (25)
The rest of parameters are self-explanatory.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
By solving the problem, the total benefit that 
could be obtained by the company (or A0 player) is 
$ 2 394 077.0. Breaking out this global result in the 
values obtained for the different essential variables 
and crops in the different seasons, some conclu-
sions can be extracted for each CPBU. For the CPBU 
Dajao, the obtained results recommend satisfying 
the auto-consumption needs and dedicating to the 
market sale of the red bean crop 0.725 the hectares 
in spring and 0.465 hectares in winter. For the CPBU 
Melián, it is recommended that, on top of satisfy-
ing the employees’ needs, it should be devoting to 
market sale 1.15 hectares of dry corn in spring and 
0.26 hectares in winter. For the CPBU Baltazar, it is 
obtained that 1.15 and 2.4 hectares of red bean for 
market sale should be planted, in addition to the 
necessary areas to satisfy the auto-consumption. The 
remaining budget of $ 8119.57 would not be spent 
in the crop planting and harvesting.
For each one of the CPBUs, Linear Programming 
models can be easily set considering only the param-
eters and variables of every one of them, and hav-
ing as a target the maximization of their individual 
benefit. By solving these problems, where only the 
conditions of each CPBU are considered, it can be 
found that:
– Maximum benefit obtained by the CPBU of Dajao 
is $ 579 833.80. Also, it will not be necessary to use 
$ 1836.97 of the available budget. This corresponds 
to the following results for the essential variable 
(Xijk) as displayed in Table 1.
– Maximum benefit obtained by the CPBU of Melián 
is $ 696 824.30. Also, it will not be necessary to 
? ?
4.13 2.70 2.01 1.41 2.08 1.41 4.16 17.77 8.71...
4.10 2.74 2.01 1.41 2.09 1.42 4.17 20.82 8.72...
4.23 2.80 2.11 1.41 2.38 1.51 4.36 17.77 8.80...
4.50 2.84 2.31 1.41 2.49 1.62 4.48 21.86 8.83
G
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
  (22)
? ?
16.11 26.03 1.21 1.40 8.31 10.22 4.10 6.45 2.22 ...
13.22 19.10 0.90 0.96 5.19 7.17 3.22 3.70 1.82 ...
16.11 26.03 1.21 1.40 8.31 10.22 4.10 6.45 2.22...
13.22 19.10 0.90 0.96 5.19 7.17 3.22 3.70 1.82
R
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
  (23)
? ? ? ?CPBU Da Me Ba
0.5 0.7 0.19 0.19 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.133...
0.65 0.7 0.22 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.65 0.6 0.114...
0.7 0.8 0.32 0.32 0.17 0.17 0.7 0.75 0.2
P P P P
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
  (24)
? ?
3.65 3.98 4.09 4.09 3.82 3.82 3.82 3.81 3.10...
3.10 3.00 3.00 3.35 3.35 2.29 2.29 2.87 2.87...
3.65 3.98 3.82 4.09 4.09 3.81 3.81 3.81 3.04...
3.10 3.00 3.00 3.35 3.35 2.29 2.29 2.87 2.87
C
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
  (21)
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use $ 3558.41 of the budget. Values for the auto-
consumption will be similar in this to the ones in 
the Table 1, and the main remarkable difference with 
the previous CPBU will be devoting 1.41 hectares 
to red bean in the winter season.
– Maximum benefit obtained by the CPBU of Baltazar 
is $ 1 117 419.0. Also, the remaining budget (not 
spent) is $ 2724.18. On top of the requirements for 
the auto-consumption, the external market sales 
would include planting 1.35 and 1.2 hectares of red 
bean respectively in spring and winter.
Therefore, in the game with perfect information 
with the hierarchical structure established between 
the four players, a Nash equilibrium point is reached 
since once the strategies of the rest of the players are 
known, if any of them would use a strategy different 
to the one proposed in Equation (10), their earnings 
would be less than the ones obtained by using the 
proposed strategies. 
When all four Linear Programming problems 
are solved, a particular case of equilibrium point is 
reached. Moreover, the joint benefit obtained if the 
A0 strategies are mandatory for B1, B2 and B3 and 
they also act optimally, is equal or higher than the 
sum of the benefits of the CPBUs operating separately, 
even if they do operate optimally.
CONCLUSION
Game Theory with Perfect Information has been 
applied to an agricultural company that is considered 
together with its three sub-units. Production results 
in terms of several crops are considered in this game, 
together with the necessary parameters to implement 
different linear programming problems. In the game 
with perfect information with hierarchical structure 
established between the four considered players (the 
management center and three production units), a 
Nash equilibrium point is demonstrated, since once 
the strategies of the rest of the players are known, 
if any of them would use a strategy different to the 
one proposed, their earnings would be less than the 
ones obtained by using the proposed strategies. The 
obtained model and its application to the agricultural 
production company as a whole and to each of its basic 
units permits not only to select which crops maximize 
the production results, but also to investigate how the 
different indicators affect the final results. It is also 
possible to analyze hypothetic production scenarios 
to plan for midterm and to adopt strategic decisions.
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